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AID TO EDUCATION-

FEDERAL FASHIONt

LEONARD F. MANNING 0

The President of the United States has touched off a great debate %tht
his recent declarationthat the Constitution prohibits federal aid to churchrelated schools. From an examination of the cases and American traditions
as well, Professor Manning condcudes that nothing in the Constitution, in
case law or in history precludes aid to church-related education in any form
or at any level.

ARE a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."' Mr. justice Douglas' characterization of our American
heritage and of our 1952 society was, naturally enough, warmly indorsed
and roundly re-echoed in episcopal circles. In other areas the Douglas
pronouncement stirred a mild tremor, particularly among those of his
admirers who, even in 1952, had come to regard him as a complete
libertarian-French style-with a mind unfettered by conformist traditions.
Mr. justice Black, albeit a most frequent collaborator of Douglas,
had more secular thoughts in 1947. In Everson v. Board of Educ.2 he
added to an otherwise clear and cohesive decision the clouded comment:
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another." 3 A few years before Douglas or
Black had turned their judicial thoughts to matters of church and
state, George Orwell had put forth a more aery aphorism. "All animals are equal," he said, "but some animals are more equal than others."'
Was justice Black thinking in terms of the animals on the Orwell farm?
Did he mean that all animals are equal but that the irreligious animal
is more equal than the religious animal? Or did he simply mean that
all animals, both religious and irreligious, are equal and that no aniWE
'

Professor Manning was asked by the editors to comment upon the two governmental
aid-to-education proposals recently in the nevws--Precident Kennedy's recommendations
to the Congress and Governor Rockefeller's recommendations, specifically the ' cholarincentive" plan, made to the New York Legislature. The two proposals have been treated
separately. The constitutional issues presented by the Precident's propofals are treated
in this article. The constitutional Lssues presented by the Governor's 1srholar-incentive"
plan are treated in Aid to Education-State Style, immediately following thU article,
p. 525 infra.
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
2.

330 U.S. 1 (1947).

3. Id. at 15.
4. Orwell, Animal Farm, ch. 10 (1945).
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mal, whether religious or irreligious, shall receive preferential treatment from the state?
In recent weeks the President of the United States expressed a point
of view equally as perplexing, though more prosaic and perhaps, for that
reason, more startling. In proposing his "federal aid-to-education" program, the President wrote: "In accordance with the clear prohibition
of the Constitution, no elementary or secondary funds are allocated for
constructing church schools or paying church schoolteachers' salaries,
and thus non-public school children are rightfully not counted in determining the funds each state will receive for its public schools."'
5. 107 Cong. Rec. 2285 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1961). Curiously enough, on the same
day that the President submitted his education message to Congress, Secretary Riblcoff
stated that he was strongly opposed to any withholding of federal funds to enforce
desegregation of public schools. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1961, p. 1, col. 8, at 22, col. 2. The
Secretary was reported to be of the opinion that civil rights problems should be solved
separately from those of education. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
Apparently the Administration's concern lest there be a violation of the first amendment
does not include a concern lest federal funds reach schools which are in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. This consideration grows "curiouser and curiouser" because
an analogy to state attempts to evade Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
has been used by certain critics to attack Governor Rockefeller's scholar-incentive plan.
The scholar-incentive plan is considered in Aid to Education-State Style, p. 525 Infra,
and the inadequacy of the analogy is considered there at p. 534.
The President's present proposal limits federal grants for construction purposes and
for payment of teachers' salaries to public elementary schools. On the other hand, it
advocates scholarship aid to students at the college or university level, including those
attending church-related colleges and universities. Included in the scholarship aspect
of the President's plan is a provision for direct federal grants to the colleges or universities, including church-related colleges and universities, of the scholarship-winner's choice.
The latter was added in recognition of the fact that "tuition and fees do not normally
cover the institution's actual expense in educating the student." Finally the plan contemplates making available to all institutions of higher education, including church-related
colleges and universities, federally sponsored long-term, low-interest loans for construction of residential housing for students and faculty and for construction of classrooms,
laboratories, libraries and related academic facilities. 107 Cong. Rec. 2285 (daily ed. Feb.
20, 1961).
It has sometimes been represented that the President has shifted his views since his early
days in Congress, but the record does not support such a conclusion. In 1949, then-Representative Kennedy introduced a bill, which remained in committee, to provide direct aid
to public schools and auxiliary services (bus transportation, nonreligious textbooks, and
health services) to all school children. H.R. 5838, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
That same year the Senate passed the Thomas bill, S. 246, which left the question of
auxiliary services to the states. When it went to the House in 1950, Representative Kennedy
offered an amendment in the Education and Labor Committee to assure Government payment
of half the costs of bus service for private and parochial schools. The amendment was rejected, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1950, p. 28, col. 3, and Mr. Kennedy then voted with a
13-12 majority on the final committee vote to reject the bill itself. N. Y. Times, March 15,
1950, p. 1, col. 7, at 27, col. 3.
The National Defense Education Act of 1958, § 305, 72 Stat. 1590, 20 U.S.C. § 445,
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The church-state issue so summarily "resolved" in the President's
message, the issues which produced the Douglas blessing and the Black
dictum, had been left, since 1952, more or less quiescent.

Even before President Kennedy made his educational-aid program
a stationary duck for ecclesiastical fire,6 Governor Rockefeller in New
provides for loans to non-profit private schools for the acquisition of science, mathematics,
and foreign language equipment. Then-Senator Kennedy voted for pasfage of the bill.
104 Cong. Rec. 17331 (195S).
On Senator Morse's amendment in the S6th Congress extending construction loans to
private, nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, discussed in note 6 infra, Senator
Kennedy was paired against. 106 Cong. Rec. 1910 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1960). In no instance,
then, has he appeared to support any proposals inconsistent with his pres,-nt ps2ition.
If, as indicated herein, federal grants to church-related elementary schools are not
unconstitutional, federal grants to church-related colleges are, a fortiori, not unconstitutional.
If federal grants to church-related schools are not unconstitutional, federal loans to churchrelated schools are, a fortiori, not unconstitutional. Other than what is noted at p. Mt0infra,
with respect to loans to church-related schools, the only question considered here is whcther
Congress can provide grants to church-related elementary schools.
As I use the terms "college" or "university" or "schools" herein, they do not include
seminaries or the so-called Sunday schools.
6. A few weeks before the President formalized his aid-to-education mesmge, His
Eminence, Francis Cardinal Spellman, was critical of the Report of the Prefident-elect's
Task Force Committee on Education because of its failure to take into account children
attending private schools. The Cardinal labeled the committee's recommendation- "unfair to most parents of the nation's 6,S00,000 parochial and private school children." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1961, p. 1, col. 4. Similar criticism was voiced regarding the President's
specific proposals by, among others, the Most Reverend Joseph F. Flannelly, Auxiliry
Bishop of the Archdiocese of New York, and by Monsignor William Me1c1anus, superintendent of Catholic schools for the Archdiocese of Chicago. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1961,
p. 22, col. 6.
The President's views did not produce a partisan religious issue. Criticism came from
many nonclerical quarters and from non-Catholics as well. For example, Senator Keating
of New York complained that President Kennedy was discriminating against Roman

Catholic schools in Florida "which are flooded with Cuban refugees." Senator Keating
noted the influx of 7,000 Cuban children into elementary schools in the Miami area,
of whom 2,500 are attending parochial schools and 3,50 public schools. He approved
a Presidential proposal that Federal assistance be given to public schools for opcrating
costs swelled by the impact of refugee children, but added that it was "apparnt, however,
that such assistance would not aid the parochial schools which have been confronted
with the identical problem." N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1961, § 1, p. 54, col. 6. Representative
McCormack, the House Majority Leader, also criticized the President's proposal for its
failure to take into account children attending sectarian and nonsectarian private schools.
N.Y. Times, March 6, 1961, p. 19, col. 3.
David Lawrence, in his syndicated National Affairs column, noted that "if the Federal
government extends aid to public-school children, as is being suggested, and dcniks such
aid to children who go to parochial or other private schools, then it can be accuse-d of
handicapping the religious education which is voluntarily sought by parents for their
children in order to supplement the regular course of studies." He suggezted federal tax
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York set afloat a moving target and rippled constitutional waters with
his scholar-incentive plan. 7 The Governor's original proposal was a
fluid one-announced without specific details-the essence of which
was to provide state tuition grants to all New York students attending
New York colleges or universities, including church-related colleges and
8
universities, of their choice.
The Governor's proposal stirred the un-Lordly emotions of the lordly
New York TimesY The Times in turn provoked some letter-to-theeditor writers who found in the proposal a violation of the "traditional
principle of separation of church and state,"'" and the Times itself
incased state aid to church-related colleges in a "prohibition well founded
in public policy and deeply rooted in American tradition."" The Times'
refunds for parents of children attending private schools. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, March 2,
1961, p. 23, col. 1.
The President's scholarship program, which included students attending church-related
colleges and universities and grants to such colleges and universities themselves, was endorsed by the Presidents of Brandeis University (Jewish-sponsored), Harvard University,
Notre Dame University (Catholic church-related) and Juniata College (affiliated with the
Church of the Brethren) but opposed by the President of Baylor University (a Baptist
institution). Dr. Nathan M. Pusey, the President of Harvard, stated that he would prefer
a system of direct grants to the colleges and universities rather than the scholarships. N.Y.
Herald Tribune, March 5, 1961, § 1, p. 31, col. 1.
Other Senators and Representatives, besides Senator Keating and Representative McCormack, have at other times proposed federal aid to private schools, including churchrelated schools. Senator Wayne Morse, for example, criticized the education bill introduced at the second session of the 86th Congress because of its failure "to consider the
needs of all of American education." The bill, he said, "neglects the 15% of our Nation's
youth who are receiving their education in nonpublic schools . . . because they and their
parents are exercising their rights within our democracy in choosing the kind of education
they desire." 106 Cong. Rec. 1888 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1960). In fact, Senator Morse's proposal to provide federal construction loans to private elementary and secondary schools
had the support of 41 of 95 Senators voting, paired or announced. 106 Cong. Rec. 1911
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1960).
7. Considered in Aid to Education-State Style, p. 525 infra.
8. The first details arose from legislative conferences. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1961, p. 1,
col. 7.
9. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1961, p. 28, col. 1.
10. Letter of Professors Walter Gellhorn, Horace M. Kallen and Edmond Cahn, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 1961, p. 22, col. 5. I do not mean to imply that the editorial epistles
were predominantly in opposition to the scholar-incentive plan. Those which arrived in
newspaper print in favor of the Governor's plan did, I believe, well outnumber those
which were opposed. The Times itself backtracked from its original position. It suggested
attaching a "needs test" and a "merit test" to the scholar incentive plan, detaching the
exclusion of students attending tuition-free colleges and the restriction to students attending
colleges in New York State, and editorialized that the grants, thus modified, "ought to go
to students as individuals without restriction as to the educational institution chosen (so
long as it is not a religious seminary)." N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1961, p. 30, col. 2.
11. Editorial, note 9 supra.
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appeal to such an orthodox thing as "tradition" was, to say the least,
not in character. Its editorial policy has seldom reflected a sentimental
attachment to pristine principles. But that, I am sure, has, if any, only
passing relevancy. What is relevant and what is important is that the
tradition to which the Times appealed is the same tradition about
which Mr. Justice Douglas spoke when he noted that "we are a religious people" and added, "[W]e find no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion or to
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence."' 2 On that point, too, I am sure, a page of history is worth
a volume of editorials.
This is not at all to suggest that tradition has no part in constitutional debate or no relation to the constitutional issues implicit in the
Governor's proposal or the President's pronouncement. On the contrary, tradition pierces and entwines constitutional debate. It is a strong
thread which winds back from present issues, through decided cases
and accepted customs, to the original intent and the intended ideals
found in the words and the practices of the men who wrote the Constitution. But it is important to know whether the principle about
which we are talking, this "principle rooted in tradition," this principle
perched upon the "wall of separation" between church and state, is
a principle of constitutional law or whether it is no more than a makeshift metaphor, a figurative phrase,h3 or what Cardozo might have called
a mere "illustration of a principle.'
No one, so far as I know, has ever argued against separation of
12. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
13. See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935). Cardozo reasroned
that the "original package doctrine" written into our law by Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1327), was never intended as a principle but as an illustra-

tion or an example of what was really the principle, namely, that the states are forbidden
to enact laws which have an exclusionarv effect on foreign and interstate commerce. We
have a kind of analogy in reverse here. The "vall of separation" which is mid to exist
between church and state appeared in Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury, Conncticut,
Baptist Association, Jan. 1, IS02, in 3 Jefferson, Writings 113 (Washington ed. 1E161). Jefferson's wall was raised in protest against the establishment of a Congregationalist State
Church in Connecticut. Jefferson objected to state support of one religion over all other
religions. The Congregationalist State Church was not disestablished in Connecticut until
131S. There were nine established (or state-preferred) churches, all Protestant, in the
original states. Not until 1R33 was the last of these disestablished. O'Neill, Religion and
Education under the Constitution 25 (1949). Jefferson, incidentally, was not the firct to
raise the wall. In a letter to King Louis XIV, Pope Innocent XI (1672-16S9) advocated
the "wall between the spiritual and the secular power" as a protection of religious liberty.
McCluskey, Catholic Viewpoint on Education 139-40 (1959). He did not make it an end
in itself. The question, then, really is what do we mean by this phrase? That, of cours-e,
is the burden of this article.
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church and state. When we affirm "separation of church and state"
we do no more than abstract an analogy and agree only on the abstraction. But the heart of the matter is the meaning of the phrase,
"separation of church and state." No one has ever claimed that the
affairs of church are the affairs of state. Certainly the state cannot
tell me what church or temple I must attend or how much I must drop on
the collection plate. Certainly the state cannot dictate the appointment
of a Roman Catholic pastor in the Archdiocese of New York, order a
merger of Orthodox and Conservative Jews, or tell the Episcopal Bishop
of California that his views on the Virgin Birth are heretical. Nor, in
the field of education, has anyone, so far as I know, ever claimed or
ever sought preferential treatment for any church-related school over
any other church-related school. Nor has anyone ever claimed any
preferential treatment for church-related schools over nonsectarian private schools, or preferential treatment for the private schools over the
common school or the public school system.
It is true, from the very nature of the situation, that when the state
provides aid for all private schools and continues its complete support
for all public schools-though there be no change in the relative position of the private schools inter sese-the private schools do, at state
expense, gain in relation to the public schools. But that is both unavoidable and unobjectionable-unavoidable because the common school
is the creature of the state and is totally dependent upon the state
for its continued existence; unobjectionable unless we are ready to
constitutionalize the public school. The latter proposition may, as I
view one aspect of the present controversy, very well be the very core
of the controversy. That is to say or to ask: is the public school the
only school possessing constitutional capacity to receive state aid?
There are other aspects of the controversy equally as important. For,
even if we give an affirmative answer to that question, must we then
distinguish between elementary and secondary education on the lower
level and higher education on the upper level? The President obviously
believes the distinction is required.'" There are others apparently of
the same opinion."5 But in neither case have we been told why this
distinction must exist. It is a distinction which deserves debate.
There are, too, those who would distinguish between federal grants
and federal loans; those who, if the grants be damned, would redeem
14. This is implicit in the President's education-aid message. See note 5 supra and
accompanying text. The President made the distinction expressly at his press conference
on March 8, 1961. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1961, p. 16, col. 3 (Question 5).
15. See Statement of New York State Council of Churches, Feb. 22, 1961, withdrawing
its opposition to the New York scholar-incentive plan. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 23,
1961, p. 17, col. 4.
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the loans." There are, to be sure, countless ways in which governments assist religion. Congress has given our churches the same taxexemptions it offers to other charitable corporations. When a church
is built it receives the same fire protection, the same police protection
which the state provides for other property owners. Indeed, even
before the church is built it is favored with the same privilege of incorporation which the state offers to other corporate promoters. Mr.
justice Holmes once suggested that the due process clause permits the
taking of property provided you do not take too much.17 It may be that
the first amendment permits the giving of aid provided we do not give
too much. But this is to ignore a principle and this is to ignore our
first beginnings. This is to ignore a history and tradition of nonpreferentialaid to religion. I readily acknowledge that, from the sound
of certain cases, the question of aid may very well be a question of
degree. That may very well be the law. I simply add, if that be the
law, the law has closed its eyes on history.'5 However valid it might
otherwise be, our concern here is not for any distinction between federal grants and federal loans. There is a primordial point which must
first be examined, that is, whether a grant to a church-related school
is a grant to a church, whether a grant to a religious establishment
is necessarily an "establishment of religion."
PRIsuMTTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

It is, of course, always possible to ascertain affirmatively the original
intent and the original purpose of a constitutional clause, but it is by
a rejection-of-objection process that the full meaning and application of the clause is better understood. This approach is desirable, too,
from the viewpoint of the very sensible rule that a statute is always
presumed to be constitutional. The presumption of constitutionality
attaches whether the statute emanates from Congress, a legislative body
possessing only delegated and, therefore, limited authority, or whether
the statute is the product of a state senate and assembly which, in
theory at least, possess unlimited governmental power. What Mr. Justice
Chase wrote of congressional power in 1796--"The deliberate decision
of the national legislature... would determine me, if the case was doubtful, to receive the construction of the legislature"--and what Mr.
Justice Day said in 1920 of the state tax power16. See Statement of Cardinal Spellman, N.Y. Times, MAarch 14, 1961, p. 21, col. 2.
17. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, S6-37 (1907); !:ee also
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
18. No comment is made here on the wisdom of the law. I do not go zo far as to
agree with Mr. Bumble that "if the law supposes that, the la, is a as:, a idiot"
19. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1796).
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When the constituted authority of the State undertakes to exert the taxing power, and
the question of the validity of its action is brought before this court, every presumption in its favor is indulged, and only clear and demonstrated usurpation of power will
authorize judicial interference with legislative action.20
-apply to all federal and state enactments and have never been questioned. The principle is as elementary as it is sensible.
But now, I do believe, certain opponents of federal aid to churchrelated schools are seeking somewhat to reverse this presumption. They
seek, it seems to me, to read into the proposals some illegal-lurking
legislative intent, even in advance of consideration by Congress, and
then ask that any such proposals be rejected out of hand by Congress
itself on the assumption that a court of law might declare the legislation unconstitutional. Quite the contrary, I believe, is true, and for
that precise reason I believe that the President has the right and the
duty to debate the constitutional issues here involved. I believe that
Congress has the same right and the same duty. I believe that both
beliefs are true because aid to church-related schools, if incorporated
into the context of the President's aid-to-education program, presents
issues which the courts cannot and will not consider.
THE TAXPAYER'S STANDING TO SUE
Some years ago when Congress gave thought to the matter of reducing
maternal and infant mortality, it resolved to render assistance through
the use of state agencies. It proposed, in other words, to assist the
states to assist themselves to protect the health of mothers and children.
The federal scheme, enacted into the Maternity Act of 1921,21 was
fashioned loosely along the lines of the President's aid-to-education
proposal. The legislation took the form of grants to the states. Mrs.
Frothingham, whom I have always pictured as a childless, elderly Beacon
Hill patrician, was bothered by such things as taxes-and the tenth
amendment. Mrs. Frothingham saw in the Maternity Act a federal
invasion of state's rights, an appropriation resulting in increased federal taxes and, to her, a denial of due process of law. She summoned
the patrician power of Beacon Hill to bear upon Treasury Secretary
Mellon to demand that he cease and desist making payments out of
the U.S. Treasury for the care of children, among whom, I do imagine,
she envisioned illegitimate children. Mrs. Frothingham was not one
to be satisfied by a courteous response to a demanding letter. She
took her demand to the courts. She had power-primogeniture, political,
financial, whatever it might have been in Massachusetts even in those
days-of persuasion to influence the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
20.

Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239 (1920).

21.

Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224.
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to join her in a companion suit. The Commonwealth sued the Secretary,
claiming to represent parens patriae all the taxpayers of Massachusetts.
.Mrs. Frothingham, despite her ancestral claim, had to pursue her case
through the lower federal courts before she arrived in the Supreme
Court of the United States. The Commonwealth of 'Massachusetts
Supreme Court. Both decisions were
simply filed an original suit in the
announced in the same opinion.2
About twenty-four years before Mrs. Frothingham doubted the
legality of the Maternity Act, a resident of the District of Columbia, a
taxpayer and citizen of the United States, questioned the constitutionality of appropriations by Congress, funneled through the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, to erect a hospital building for
an order of nuns of the Roman Catholic Church. 'Mr. Bradfield, resident in the District, went to the federal courts, too, and sought to
enjoin the commissioners from making their expenditures in aid of
a "religious society." When Mr. Bradfield's case came to the Supreme
Court, the Court had some qualms about its right to listen to his complaint. It assumed, as it were, its own jurisdiction. The Court noted
that it was passing over "the various objections made to the maintenance of this suit on account of an alleged defect of parties, and also
in regard to the character in which the complainant sues, merely that
of a citizen and taxpayer of the United States and a resident of the
District of Columbia." ' The Bradfield Court found that there was no
violation of the first amendment and so it never decided whether it
had power to annul the appropriation. A rather unusual procedure'
but nonetheless the Court's reasoning, and the question remained
whether Mr. Bradfield had a standing to sue in the first place.
The Frotingham Court looked back upon Bradfield and decided
that the Bradfield Court was correct in its assumption but added
that that was just "about as far as they can go."2,
The problem presented is whether the plaintiff has actually been
injured or sufficiently injured by the allegedly unconstitutional act. The
Frothingham Court recognized the right of a taxpayer in a municipality
to enjoin illegal or unconstitutional appropriations or acts of municipal
officers. The appropriation obviously results in a depletion of the
22.

Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 US. 447 (1923).

23. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1S99).
24. Marshall did something akin to this in larbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1503), when he first decided the merits, Le., that Mr. Marbury was entitled to his

commission, but
first place. It is
it has jurisdiction
25. The sense
"Oklahoma !"

then decided that he had no authority to decide the merits in the
the normal practice of a federal court to determine in limine whc-her
before it undertakes consideration of the merits of the controverwy.
is from Frothingbam. The quote is from the "Kansas City" song in
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municipal treasury which in turn requires additional taxes to replenish
the municipal coffers, which taxes in turn directly or proximately bear
upon the municipal taxpayer. Thus the municipal taxpayer, in his or
her status as a taxpayer, has a sufficient interest in the controversy to
permit the suit. The same interest and standing to sue would belong
to a taxpayer in a local school district. In all of the cases to be considered herein, save Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.2 0 and
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,27 the suit brought by
the taxpayer was against municipal officers or school districts or against
local administrators of a local district within which the plaintiff was a
resident and taxpayer. In Cochran and Barnette the suit was directed
by a resident taxpayer against the state board of education. Whether
a taxpayer in a state has a right to challenge in court the constitutionality
of an appropriation by the state legislature or an expenditure by a state
officer, Frothingham held, is a matter of state law for each state to
decide. Only if the state permits the suit can the case reach the Supreme
Court. Obviously if state law does not permit the suit it is impossible
to argue the constitutional issues-except to one's self or in public.
But Frothingham was concerned with the right of a taxpayer of the
United States to maintain what in effect was a permissive suit against
the United States. The Court, dismissing Mrs. Frothingham's suit,
said:
The interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its moneys is direct
and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate. It is upheld by a large number of state cases and is the rule of this
Court ....
Nevertheless, there are decisions to the contrary ....
The reasons
which support the extension of the equitable remedy to a single taxpayer in such
cases are based upon the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the corporation, which is not without some resemblance to that subsisting between stockholder
and private corporation ....
But the relation of a taxpayer of the United States
to the Federal Government is very different. His interest in the moneys of the
Treasury-partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources-is shared
with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the
effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating
and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of
a court of equity.
The administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation to be
imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers, the extent of whose several liability is
indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern. If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every
other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review
but also in respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration
requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity may be questioned. The bare
suggestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the
26.

281 U.S. 370 (1930).

27. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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conclusion v.hich we have reached, that a suit of this character cannot be main2
tained. 8

The Court also dismissed the companion case brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It held that the state enjoyed no right
parens patriae as a representative of all the taxpayers of its commonwealth and it, therefore, also lacked capacity to sue. Put in its boldest
effective terms, the Court said that Mrs. Frothingham was but one
taxpayer out of approximately 150 million taxpayers in the United States
and, therefore, the impact of any resulting tax upon her was de minimis.
And it added, in effect, that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could
not reduce the ratio to bring the impact of the tax closer to home by
its representation of the total of taxable residents within that state.
It seems to me, therefore, that the federal aid to education bill must,
if enacted, go without constitutional challenge for want of a plaintiff
possessing a sufficient interest to sue.2 ' That is why I believe the President-however wrong he may be on the substantive issue-is exercising a proper prerogative in raising and discussing the constitutional
problem. He cannot be told to proceed with abandon and leave the
Constitution to the care of the courts. That is why, I would submit, Congress has the right to debate the constitutional as well as the
policy issues involved in the education bill. The constitutional issues
will be automatically resolved when and if the bill, with whatever aid
to church-related schools may be attached, is enacted by Congress and
approved by the President of the United States. A1nd that is why the
constitutional issue is properly a public issue. It belongs as well to the
electorate at large to decide through its influence on its elected representatives in the Congress.
The constitutional issue, in the context of the proposed Federal aidto-education bill, is in the nature of a political question. Frothingiam
recognized this when it noted:
In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff State is brought to the naked
contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several States by
the mere enactment of the statute, though nothing has been done and nothing is to
be done without their consent; and it is plain that that question, as it is thus presented, is political and not judicial in character, and therefore is not a matter v.hich
admits of the exercise of the judicial power.' 0
29.

262 U.S. at 456-S7.
It would not appear that the Frothingham case is to be ditinguished

30.

262 U.S. at 433.

28.

imply
because the first amendment was not in issue there. In Elliott v. White, 23 F2d 997
(D.C. Cir. 192S) (suit to enjoin payments to chaplains), the first amendment was in
issue and the court of appeals dismissed because the plaintiff taxpayer did not have
standing to use.
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We cannot escape the Frothingham case by attaching to a congressional enactment a rider requiring the Court to accept jurisdiction to
decide the constitutionality of the enactment itself. It would appear
that in our desire to steer away from Scylla we would swing into the
swirl of Charybdis. For it would then appear that Congress would be
seeking an advisory opinion. An advisory opinion, as Muskrat v. Unitcd
States3 told us some years ago, Congress cannot compel. For that would
impair the independence of the judiciary and violate the doctrine of the
separation of federal powers and would purport to give the Court jurisdiction over an issue which is not presented in the form of a case or
controversy.32
The situation here presented is not at all unusual. There are many
parts of the Constitution which do not under all circumstances admit of
interpretation by the courts. These sections are, in effect, left to the
executive or to the legislature or to the electorate--i.e., to the political
quarters of our government-to construe and enforce as best they can.
Thus, the question of the validity of a state's ratification of an amendment to the Constitution is automatically determined when Congress
counts that state's ratification and orders the promulgation of the amendment. The determination is not reviewable in the courts. 3 Similarly, the
meaning of the term "republican form of government," as used in Article
IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, is one finally for the President and the
Congress to determine within their respective spheres.34 And the enforcing
power to be brought against a state Governor who refuses to surrender a
fugitive from justice to the state having jurisdiction of the crime lies with
the electorate, not with the courts." Though the Constitution seemingly
commands the surrender,3" the courts cannot compel. Recourse is left to
the will of the electorate expressed in the voting booth.
There is a modicum, but not a very small modicum, of reasonableness
in this result. It is not always wise to leave the Constitution to the courts
to construe. For then what Congress can do and cannot do becomes always dependent upon the philosophies, the prejudices, the mores of nine
men who sit in the high-backed chairs in the courthouse in Washington,
31.

219 U.S. 346 (1911).

32. Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction upon the Court (and upon
federal courts generally) only in certain enumerated instances and limits this jurisdiction
to "cases" and "controversies." A "case or controversy" means that there must be between the parties (case) a genuine dispute (controversy) and not a contrived one, See
Muskrat v. United States, supra note 31, and cases cited therein. See also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
34. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
35. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
36. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
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D.C. There is, in fact, nothing in the Constitution which requires that
the Supreme Court interpret the Constitution and exercise a kind of
limited veto over the acts of Congress. That was a power arrogated unto
the Court by Marshall in Marbury v. MadisonY I do not suggest that
this is wrong. It is far, far too late even to voice such a suggestion. But
the Court itself has often said that the precise words of the Constitution
are not moulds which fix its meaning for all times and all circumstances." I would submit that there are times when the President, the
Congress and the electorate itself are entitled to be heard respecting the
meaning of the Constitution. And I would suggest that the present issue
presented in the context of the President's proposals might well be one
which admits of such a resolution.
If, as presented, the issue is taken as a political or popular issue rather
than a justiciable one, we have then almost a union of policy considerations and constitutional considerations. I see nothing essentially wrong
in that. I see, therefore, nothing essentially improper when the Council
of Protestant Churches argues that religious divisiveness will result from
federal aid to church-related schools, or when the Cardinal Archbishop of
New York complains that an injustice to the parents of children attending Catholic parochial schools will result from the denial of such aid.
Neither is a constitutional consideration, but here the Constitution and
the policy are both the concern of Congress.
I do think that if, by some procedural maneuver, this issue comes
before the Supreme Court, the nine Justices are then required to give preeminent consideration to the will of the legislature and the will of the
electorate. I do not say that the Congress and the electorate can do no
wrong. I do say that in a representative democracy there is a very strong
presumption that they can do no wrong.
Tim

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The first amendment to the Constitution reads in part, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise therof. ..."
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution reads in part, "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
37.

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

3S. "This provision is made in a Constitution intendcd to endure for ages to come
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Aarzball, C. J,
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Xrheat.) 316, 415 (1319). "But to the legiL ature
no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of deeply-cherished libertie." Frankfurter, J., in Mlinersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 6f0 (1940).
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deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
The first amendment taken literally and in its original scope imposed
restraints only upon Congress. While there is no implication of that fact
in the clause itself, the implication lies in history that the clause operates
to restrict the judiciary3 9 and the executive4" as well as Congress and,
therefore, operates to restrict all branches and agencies of the federal
government. This is implicit in the fact that the "rights" acquired with
respect to the federal government result only from the imposition of restraints-restraints put upon the federal government for the dual purpose
of protecting individual liberties and state sovereignty vis-h-vis federal
sovereignty. Thus, while an individual has no affirmative right to religious liberty, he does have a right to be free from federal interference
with his religious liberty. And while the federal government was denied
the right to support an established church, the states were at the outset
free to do so. In fact, as heretofore seen, state established churches did
exist and continued to exist until 1833. 1'
In brief, neither the first amendment nor the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
enumeration of restraints upon federal power which is affirmed in the first
eight amendments, operated to restrain the states. The idea that the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, which was
promulgated in 1868, incorporated the Bill of Rights so as to impose its
inhibitions upon the states, was rejected in 1873 by the Court in the
Slaughter-House Cases." Then in 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,"'
the Court used the due process clause as the vehicle for applying the
"free exercise" clause of the first amendment to the states.
It is sometimes said that Cantwell incorporated the entire first amendment into the due process clause of the fourteenth. That is not precisely
so.4
In Cantwell, the Court struck down a Massachusetts licensing
39.

See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).

40. There has been no court case involving the President or the executive department.
Traditionally each President has assumed himself to be bound and has so conducted executive affairs. The tradition has established the principle. In any event the President
is required to take an oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution." U.S.
Const. art. II, § 1. The President's oath, it would appear, would make him subject to
the Constitution and to amendments to the Constitution.
41. See note 13 supra.
42. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
43. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
44. When counsel argued before the Court recently that the Pennsylvania Sunday law
violated the establishment clause, Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarked: "I do not think
you will find any cases in which a majority of this Court said the specific proscriptions of
the first amendment were made applicable to the states." Mr. Justice Douglas, on the
other hand, immediately offered "to give you a good list of them." 29 U.S.L. Week 3175
(Dec. 13, 1960).
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statute which sought to require a permit to disseminate religious literature. Thus the Court was concerned with religious liberty and not with
the establishment of a religion. Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, did speak of both clauses:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double

aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom
to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may

choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise
of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two conccpts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.4
The Cantwell Court considered a state statute which impaired the first
amendment. It had no reason to differentiate between the establishment
clause as it is applied directly to the federal government in the first
amendment and the establishment clause as it might bear upon the
states through the operation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Cantwell was doing no more than following the precepts of
Twining v. New Jersey" and Palko v. Connecticut 1 7 The latter cases
had already formulated the rule that by reason of the imposition of the
fourteenth amendment upon the Bill of Rights the individual bad
secured, as against the states, only those immunities which are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."'I
It would have been possible, in other words, even after taking into
account the holding in Cantwell, to argue that the free exercise clause
operated as a restriction upon the states but that the establishment clause
did not apply to the states or, at least, that it applied to the states only
insofar as it related to an individual's religious liberty. Religious liberty
can coexist with an established church. There is religious liberty in
England. There is also an established church. The possibility of such
a distinction remained inchoate. In the blur of words which emanated
from the Court in the twelve opinions-majority and dissenting-which
proclaimed the Court's decisions in Evcrson;1 9 McCollum ' and Zorach,5 '
between 1947 and 1952, the principle was established that the establish45. 310 U.S. at 303-04.
46. 211 U.S. 73 (1903).
47. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

4S. Id. at 325. Twining noted that some "rights" recognized and protected under the
first eight amendments are protected under the due procecss clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The test, Twining said, was whether the rights were "of such a nature that
they are included in the conception of due process of law." 211 US. at 99.
49. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), discussed p. 516 infra.
50. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (194S), discusscd p. 520 infra.
51. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), discussed p. 521 infra.
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ment clause applied with equal force to both the state and federal governments. It is to be kept in mind, therefore, that whatever limitations the
Court, by reason of the first amendment, imposed upon state action in
those three cases and in Cantwell and in other cases to be considered
herein, the same limitations apply with equal impact to the acts of
Congress, and thus cases involving state law need not and will not herein
be distinguished from cases involving federal law.
Insistence, however, upon recognition of the precise issue decided by
the Cantwell Court is not mere insistence upon abstract adherence to
accuracy. It may be too late in the day to question the imposition of the
establishment clause upon the states, but it is not too late to recall that
Mr. Justice Roberts conceived the establishment clause-either as applied to the states or as applied to the federal government-as a guarantee of liberty, a guarantee of individual liberty to believe what one
chooses to believe without fear of governmental interference. Despite the
many words written about the "wall of separation" between church and
state in the many opinions in Everson and McCollum, it is that guarantee
of freedom from compulsion which is recognized and is respected and is at
the heart of the majority opinions in Everson and McCollum and in
Zorach as well. That proposition brings us full face with the meaning of
the establishment clause.
THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF ESTABLISHMENT

"Undoubtedly the Court has the right to make history," Professor
Corwin once remarked, "but it does not have the right to remake it.""
Professor Corwin's comment was prompted by the Supreme Court's misreading or remaking of history in the McCollum case. It would serve
no useful purpose to review here the mass of material-historical, conjectural, analytical, superficial, relevant, irrelevant, philosophical, munMcCollum but
dane-on the original meaning of establishment. Not5 only
3
Everson as well loosed a spate of books and articles.
There is no need to recall the fact that the "wall of separation" is not
a constitutional phrase; that it came into our law, in Reynolds v. United
States,54 as a metaphor to explain the guarantee of individual freedom of
conscience and as an argument against preferential treatment of any religion; that it was so used by Thomas Jefferson in his letter to the Bap52.

Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob.

3, 20 (1949).

53. For a rather complete cataloguing of church-state articles see 15 Record of N.Y.C.BA.
424 (1960). A particularly interesting, concise but yet rather complete analysis of historical evidence of the original meaning appears in the form of a debate between two
noted authorities, Leo Pfeffer and James Milton O'Neill, in 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 225 (1953).
54.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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tist Congregation of Danbury, Connecticut;

that Jefferson himself and
Madison, too, openly advocated the teaching of religion in state-supported collegesJ 0
There is no need to recall that from our first national beginnings we
have recognized that religion has a proper place in government; that we
have always had stamped upon our coin and upon our currency "in God
we trust"; that we have had chaplains in the Armed Forces, chaplains
in Congress, Government-built churches at our military and naval academies. Mr. Justice Douglas, in Zorach, recounted some of these as among
the innumerable instances of the "neutral" cooperation between religion
and government in our country.
I am sure that the authors of our Constitution never intended to
make religion anathema in our Nation and the religious a pariah in our
society. I am sure that in its origin the establishment clause was directed
against a federally established church and only at precfrcntial federal
aid for one religion over another. But I am also sure that, though there
be an unreasonable distortion of history in this respect, the distortionon the present issue-may well be irrelevant. Even those who today feel
strong emotions about the wall of separation acknowledge that it is not
an adamantine wall, that historically there have been many breaches.
What they fear, I rather suspect, is the admission of a Trojan horse
through the wall. That fear loses its focus on history, but history is, as
Professor Corwin implied, what the judges make it out to be.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ESTABLISHMENT

Mr. Justice Roberts told us that the establishment clause "forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship." ' What is "compulsion?" What is "compulsion by
law"?
In 1934, young Mr. Hamilton was a man of college age with sincere
and serious scruples about warfare and military training. He was, in fact,
expelled from a state college in California because he had refused to take
a prescribed course in military training. The Court sanctioned the epulsion: 9 The state, reasoned the Court, as a matter of self-defense, can
require its citizens to bear arms and, therefore, to be trained to bear
arms. Conscientious objectors have escaped military service not by constitutional fiat but by congressional grace. The price plaintiff paid for
his religious conviction was the loss of a public college education.
55.

Note 13 supra.

56.

See Reed, J., dissenting in

AlcCollum

v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 245-43 114S).

57. 343 U.S. at 312-13.
58. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
59. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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Religious conviction made military training a sin in Mr. Hamilton's
mind. A religious conviction might also conceive of sin in such a harmless
thing as saluting the American flag. It was so considered by young Master
Barnette, who nine years later, in West Virginia, refused to salute the
flag. Trained in the teachings of Jehovah's Witnesses, the child had been
taught that the flag was a graven image and the salute a form of idolatry.
Because he refused to sin, young Master Barnette, too, was expelled from
school. Only in his case it was a public elementary school. The Court
found here a clash with the first amendment and held the expulsion unconstitutional. o Comparing Hamilton, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote:
Here .. .we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. They
are not merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they may be informed
as to what it is or even what it means .... This issue is not prejudiced by the
Court's previous holding that where a State, without compelling attendance, extends
college facilities to pupils who voluntarily enroll, it may prescribe military training
as part of the course without offense to the Constitution. It was held that those
who take advantage of its opportunities may not on ground of conscience refuse
compliance with such conditions. Hamilton v. Regents. . . .In the present case
attendance is not optional. 61

The state requires attendance at the primary level. It does not require
a college education. And, as every wandering lad must know, there are
truant laws and truant officers. This, then, would be a form of compulsion, a form of compulsion by law.
Both Hamilton and Barnette reached toward the free exercise clause.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 2 in 1925, was wholly confined to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pierce, with a unanimous
Court nullifying Oregon's compulsory public school attendance law, recognized the right of private elementary schools, both secular and sectarian, to exist in our society, and the right of the parents to send their
child to the school of their choice. The state may require parents to send
their children to some school. And it may prescribe minimum academic
standards for all schools.
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good
moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to
good citizenship must be taught,
and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimi03
cal to the public welfare.
But the state cannot compel attendance at public schools. It cannot
"standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
60. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 631-32.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534.
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public teachers only."O-4 The Court made uncommon common sense when
it recognized that "the child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations"15
Compulsion, as it was found to exist or not to exist in Pierce, Hamilton and Barnette, was not forgotten. It added a touch of color, if not
a penetrating dye, to the later cases of Everson, McCollum and Zorach.
That is interesting because Pierce, Hamilton and Barnette talked in
terms of liberty, and if they were to be grouped under the first amendment they would relate exclusively to the free exercise clause. Evcrson,
McCollum and Zorach commingled considerations of compulsion-or
the free exercise of religion-with considerations of the establishment
clause. The establishment clause-insofar as it was alleged to conflict
with governmental aid to a particular religion or a religious societyfirst had the Court's attention in Bradfield v. Roberts" in 1899.
Bradfield could find nothing objectionable in a "contract" between
the District of Columbia and Providence Hospital, even though Providence Hospital was owned and operated by a religious order of Roman
Catholic nuns and even though the District Commissioners had undertaken at Government expense to erect two buildings for the religious
order. The Court found this to be "simply a case" of "a secular corporation" managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the Catholic
Church but who, nevertheless, ministered to all and not merely to
Catholic patients. Thus a religious establishment is not synonymous
with an establishment of religion.
Are we required, at this juncture, however, to distinguish between
education and health? Are we to deny to religious schools the federal
aid we allow to religious hospitals? This potential distinction, even if
reasonable to conceive, never quite quickened. The Indian brave, Quick
Bear, suggested it in 1908 but the Court found it a distinction without
a difference.
Quick Bear v. LeZpp 7 sanctioned direct payments out of "treaty
funds" and "trust funds"--both created by Congress in settlement of
Indian land claims and in accord with Indian treaties and both administered by the Secretary of the Interior-to the Bureau of Catholic
Indian Missions to educate the Sioux in sectarian elementary schools
conducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. The
Court reasoned that this money appropriated by Congress really belonged to the Indians and that if the Sioux elected to have it spent to
64. Id. at 535.
65. Ibid.
66. 17S U.S. 291 (1899); aLso considered p. 503 supra.
67. 210 U.S. 50 (190g).
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erect and maintain sectarian schools the first amendment was not
opposed. The first amendment, it is to be noted though, was not
directly in issue. The complaining brave had argued that congressional policy, as well as the Constitution, precluded payments to sectarian schools. The legislative policy, put into the form of a statutory
declaration6" only a few years before, was, as counsel for the Government pointed out, actually the reversal of an eighty-year-old congressional practice of subsidizing religious education among the Indians. 0
The subsidies had during those years been appropriated not out of
any obligated treaty funds or obligated trust funds but out of the
general treasury of the United States. If there had been a constitutional objection to the earlier practice, the Government argued, surely
it would have been discovered in the course of those eighty years.7 0
The Court, citing Bradfield, briefly replied, "Some reference is made
to the Constitution in respect to this contract with the Bureau of
Catholic Indian Missions.71 It is not contended that it is unconstitutional and it could not be."

At this turn two things were apparent. In Quick Bear, education was
involved, education in elementary schools among those who were supposedly less civilized and less literate than their white brethren and,
for that reason, more susceptible to proselytism. We do not distinguish
then the church-related school from the church-related hospital. The
mind of man as well as corporeal man is a legitimate concern of government. Secondly, the Government quite apparently felt that it got
a good bargain from the Sisters of Charity in Bradfield and from the
Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions in Quick Bear. It was apparently
cheaper to pay for educational services and medical services than to
build government schools and government hospitals.
It is true that the Court in Quick Bear noted the fact that Congress
had not established a system of public schools upon the Indian reservations, and thus it might be said that only where no adequate public
school system existed would Congress or the states be free to provide
direct subsidies for church-related schools. And it might be possible
to speculate that the Commissioners of the District of Columbia were
faced with a quasi-emergency kind of need for hospital rooms in the
Bradfield case. Are we, therefore, required to isolate Bradficld and
Quick Bear to their independent facts? Are we required to limit the
principles implicit in those cases to the kind of emergency or quasi72
emergency presented there? Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, § 1, 30 Stat. 79.
210 U.S. at 56 n.1, at 58-62.
Argument of counsel, id. at 74.
Id. at 81.
281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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decided in 1930, talked about schools in a state where a public education system had been adequately established, and Cochran seems to
give us a negative reply.
In the period between Quick Bear and Cochran, the period between
1908 and 1930, liberty was the Court's concern. It found no occasion to re-examine the establishment clause. It was almost as if disestablishment having been completed in the states in 1833, we would
hear no more of it. In the twenty-two years following Quick Bear,
only in the Selective Draft Law Cases73 which sustained the power of
Congress to conscript citizens for military service, did the Court speak
of the establishment clause and then, with presidential spontaneity,
it summarily disposed of plaintiff's first amendment objection to the
exemption of conscientious objectors:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment
of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First
Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act to which we at the
outset referred, because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to
do more.74
Then, as noted, came Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. in
1930. Cochran found that education served a public purpose and that
the state's supplying of secular textbooks to children attending parochial
elementary school also served a public purpose and was not unconstitutional. Whatever "emergency" qualification Quick Bear might require to be put on aid to sectarian schools, whatever limitation might
have been implied from the absence of a public school system, whatever distinction-howsoever valid-we read into Bradfield between
hospitals and schools, are certainly now removed.
Cochran was the product of a unanimous Court, enriched by the
presence of Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone. I mention that fact
specifically because it is hard for me to conceive how those Justices
would lightly turn aside, indeed ignore, the first amendment. There
are authorities who would have us note with technical nicety, but
with absolute accuracy, that Cochran did not discuss the establishment
clause, that it was not until Cantwell in 1940 that the religious guarantees of the first amendment were expressly "incorporated" into the
fourteenth amendment and thus expressly made applicable to the states.
The plaintiff in Cochran had argued that the tax imposed upon him
for the purchase of books for children attending church-related schools
was a taking of private property for a private purpose. The Court
simply found education to be a public purpose. But as long ago as
73. 245 U.S. 366 (1913).
74. Id. at 3M9-90.
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1908, in Twining v. New Jersey,7" the Court had said that there were
certain substantive rights, basic and fundamental to man, which cannot be denied without denying due process of law. And in Gitlow v.
New York, 6 in 1925, the Court had reasoned that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated the first amendment's guarantee of freedom
of speech. This became an express holding in Fiske v. Kansas,77 decided
in 1927, and was accepted as common knowledge in 1930. Gitlow had
not passed without the usual volume of legal comment." And only
months after Cochran, in 1931, the same Court, presided over by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, tripped Minnesota 79 and California 0 statutes
which fell before the first amendment.
Are we to say now that Hughes, Holmes, Brandeis and Stone did
not read what had been written before 1930? That would be rather
difficult, because Mr. Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion in
Gitlow in which he found that freedom of speech had been denied one
of its citizens by the state of New York."' And Mr. Justice Brandeis
joined in that dissent. It is more reasonable to conclude that the
Cochran Court necessarily found that whatever impairment of the
first amendment there may have been present, it was not serious enough
to require the annulment of the state statute. It is equally reasonable
to conclude that the Court found no impairment of the first amendment
at all because the educational interests which the state promoted by
supplying secular textbooks to children attending sectarian schools
served a public purpose. In an event, the Cochran case was cited and
accepted without rebuke by Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority
in Everson v. Board of Educ.,8 2 and even Mr. Justice Rutledge in his
Everson dissent noted that Cochran "by oblique ruling" had opened
the way for the later decision.83
On that point Rutledge was right. After Cochran, Everson was
inevitable. 84 So was a change in the personnel of the Court. Perhaps
75. 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
76. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
77. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
78. See, e.g., Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 431 (1925).
79. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
80. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
81. 268 U.S. at 672.
82. 330 U.S. 1,7 (1947).
83. Id. at 29.
84. In Cochran, plaintiff's attorneys specifically argued that private schools, which
charge tuition and which require children to buy their own books, received an indirect
aid when the books are supplied by the state, and that if the legislature cannot tax to
aid private schools it cannot do the same thing by indirection. 281 U.S. at 371-72. It is
interesting to note that plaintiff's attorneys concluded that if the textbook provision were

1961]

AID TO EDUCATION--FEDERAL FASHION

517

the latter affected the former. One observation is accurate. The Justices became more voluble. The Justices of more recent years will
never be charged with indolence. They spread confusion as easily as
they spread words. Confusion comes not because they write too little
but because they write too much-and too little of the too much is
pertinent to the point at issue. And so the majority opinion of Mr.
justice Black in Everson was sprinkled with dicta. To the language
to which I referred at the outset, Mr. Justice Black appended the
admonition that "no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."85 It is the dicta in Everson which the President entertained
when, with rather arbitrary abandon, he announced that Everson foredosed debate on the constitutionality of federal aid to church-related
schools.5 6 Dictum, to begin with, is not an ingredient of the doctrine
of stare decisis. A dictum has never been considered a command requiring obeisance in subsequent cases, particularly not in cases formulating principles of constitutional law.67 What is more, I would suggest
that the President misread the Everson dicta and, what is worse, ignored what Everson held.
Everson held that reimbursement of transportation costs which New
Jersey gave to the parents of children attending parochial schools was
not in conflict with the establishment clause of the first amendment.
"The fact that a tate law, passed to satisfy a public need," wrote Mr.
justice Black, "coincides with the personal desires of the individuals
most directly affected is certainly an inadequate reason for us to say
that a legislature has erroneously appraised the public need."'5 Citing
Cochran,he added: "It is much too late to argue that legislation intended
to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves
no public purpose. ""
'Mr. Justice Black looked upon the providing of transportation as
sustained, then tuition of those attending private schools can be paid, transportation
furnished, the salaries of instructors supported and the construction of buildings subsidized. Id. at 372-73.
85. 330 U.S. at 16.
S6. Transcript of President's News Conference, N.Y. Times, March 2, 1961, p. 12,
col. S (Question 23).

87. "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 US.
283, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S. Co. v.
Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (ISSS).
S8. 330 U.S. at 6.
89. 330 U.S. at 7.
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a safety provision for the protection of all children, 0 and it is therefore somewhat our fashion to label Everson with a "child safety" or a
"child health" tag and to embroider upon Cochran an "auxiliary aid"
emblem. A "child benefit" theory of explaining aid to church-related
schools is warranted and reasonable enough, I do suppose, but any
terminology of labels has a modern advertising appeal and, with it,
a Madison Avenue weakness. A principle of constitutional law or constitutional construction cannot, with propriety, turn on a catch-phrase
or on a slogan any more than it can turn on a figure of speech." t
The blunt and inescapable fact is that education is the legitimate
concern of Government and the Government has the right to lend its
aid to education, to lend its aid to all schools which satisfy the community's educational needs and which satisfy the state's requirements
respecting secular courses. Church-related schools do satisfy those
needs and those requirements. Is it not immaterial that they might
in addition teach religion or satisfy the religious needs of segments
of their respective communities? The President, it seems to me, has
said this, too. But in the flashing of the Everson dicta he failed, I
would submit, to realize that he had said it.
The President distinguished loans to private elementary and secondary
schools made pursuant to the National Defense Education Act"2 from
"across-the-board" loans for the construction of such schools including therein church-related schools. He suggested that the latter
posed constitutional problems not present in the former. Loans pursuant to the National Defense Education Act, the President indicated,
were constitutionally acceptable because they were made for a specific
purpose and in the interest of national defense."3 I should rather think
that in this day of sputniks whirling through our and Venus' skies,
education per se is a sufficiently specific purpose and that education
per se is in the interest of national defense. But that is not the critical
point. The point is that everyone concedes that education is of national
concern and that it admits of the exercise of the national power. The
very submission of the federal aid-to-education bill presupposed that
fact. But national defense is only one source or occasion for the exercise of federal power. It may also find its source in the national
welfare 9 4 in the war powers, in the commerce power, in the tax power
90. Actually the New Jersey township (Ewing Township) did not provide bus transportation. Rather it reimbursed parents who provided their own transportation.
91. See criticism of the inordinate use of the metaphor, "wall of separation," supra
note 13.
92. See note 5 supra.
93. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1961, p. 16, col. 3 (Question 5).
94. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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or in any of the other powers specifically delegated to Congress and
read liberally in the context of the auxiliary power contained in the
"necessary and proper" clause. These powers are affirmatively given
in rather broad language, but the first amendment is a limitation applicable to any and all of these powers. In other words, the federal
government cannot exercise any power in a way which would violate
the first amendment. If federal aid to church-related schools does not
violate the first amendment when the Government acts in the interest
of national defense, it does not violate the first amendment when the
Government acts in the interest of the national welfare. The restriction on power, expressed in the establishment clause, is, as it were,
omnipresent. That restriction always remains. Only the reason for
the affirmative exercise of power changes.
Mr. Justice Rutledge dissented in Everson, and quite vigorously,
too. Rutledge apparently objected to any aids to any children which
would help to get them to any school where they might obtain any
religious instruction. He found the establishment clause, "broadly but
not loosely phrased," a "compact and exact summation of its author's
views" and, borrowing James Madison's characterization of Jefferson's
Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, "a Model of technical
precision, and perspicuous brevity."0 5 The model of technical precision and the compact clarity which Mr. Justice Rutledge found in the
first amendment does not sit well with the rest of the Constitution. It
is rather difficult to reconcile this clarity and technical exactitude with
the fact that we required almost immediately the first ten amendments
to clarify what was granted to the national government in the first
place, or with the fact that only five years after the Constitution became
effective we needed the eleventh amendment to clarify the meaning
of article III of the original document,"O or with the fact that it took
the sixteenth amendment to resolve certain ambiguities in the term
"direct tax,1117 or with the fact that we were never told when the
President's term commenced, or with the fact that the twentieth amendment was added, in part, to clarify the rights which devolve upon the
Vice President when he succeeds to the office of the Presidency, or
with the fact that we do not know to this day what is meant by the
President's "inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said
95. 330 U.S. at 31.
96. To overcome Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which had held that

art. III, § 2, insofar as it gave the Court jurisdiction over controvcrsie3 to which a state
shall be a party, was a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity, an interpretation Eaid
never to have been intended by the authors of the Constitution.
97. See Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 249, vacated on rchcaring,

ISS U.S. 601 (IS95).
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office, '98 or with the fact that there was always skepticism about the
meaning of the term "privileges and immunities.""
Notoriety, nevertheless, attended the Rutledge dissent. Perhaps it
was the sheer force of the dissent, perhaps it was the dilation of the
Black dicta which betokened McCollum v. Board of Educ.,100 decided
in 1948. And, as if to formulate a rule (which has some accuracy and
merit in recent years) that today's dissents make tomorrow's law, Mr.
Justice Reed's dissent in McCollum' anticipated Zorach v. Clauson.t 2
Neither is precisely in point because both were concerned with the
introduction of religious teaching into the public schools and not with
state aid to church-related schools. But, at the same time, both cases
found cause to be concerned for the establishment clause. McColum
used establishment to belabor free exercise.
McCollum found unconstitutional a "released-time" program adopted
in Champaign, Illinois. The "Champaign Plan," to which little Vashti
McCollum objected, permitted religious instruction to be given by private
or outside religion teachers to children in the public elementary school
who, or whose parents, requested it. The classes were conducted
in the public school building. Attendance records were required to be
kept and reported to the school principal in the same manner as attendance at other classes was required to be reported. Children who
did not attend religion classes were required to attend classes in secular
studies. The Court agreed with younger Master McCollum. Fault
was found not only with the fact that the public school buildings were
used for the dissemination of religious doctrines but with the fact,
so found by the Court, that the state afforded sectarian groups an
invaluable aid, the state's compulsory education laws, to teach religion.
The Court, with Mr. Justice Black again writing its opinion, seemed
to regard students in the public school as a kind of captive audience.
Justice Black rebelled at the idea of subjecting a captive audience to
any religious indoctrination, even those who freely choose to receive it.
Here again we have "compulsion by law"-looked upon this time
not as a curtailment of religious liberty but as an aid to religious
societies. Although no one compels the child to receive religious in98.
99.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. Regarding these and many others, it can be said,
fleas
Big fleas have little
Upon their backs to bite 'er
And little fleas have littler fleas
Et ad infinitum.

100. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
101.
102.

Id. at 238.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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struction, he is there because the state requires him to be there-or
at a private school. And he cannot escape unless he be an artful
dodger, more sly of mind or fleet of foot than the truant officer. While
there is no immediate compulsion to receive religious instruction, he
is, if agnostic, subjected to embarrassment when he elects not to receive religious instruction or, if a member of a minority creed, when
he elects not to follow the crowd. The immediate compulsion upon
the child is more the equivalent of embarrassment. But it does have
roots in the Black dictum which I quoted at the outset of this article.
There is a preference, however remote, given to all religions over
irreligion.
2.cCollzum has two aspects-there was, so it was claimed, aid to religious groups by giving them free of charge the use of the public
school buildings and there was, as noted, the compulsion. It was, in
particular, or so it seems to me, the first aspect of the majority opinion
which stirred Mr. Justice Reed to dissent, and his dissent, I do believe,
has led to the silent overruling of that aspect of McCollum. Justice Reed
objected to the monotonous repetition of and reliance on Jefferson's "wall
of separation"--particularly here when it was used to reject an inschool released time program, the very thing which Jefferson advocated.
Jefferson, while Chancellor of the University of Virginia (a state-supported university), had, in fact, recommended that university facilities
be made available to all religious denominations to teach their religious
beliefs. 1 3 Reed was wrong only if we must distinguish between elementary education and higher education. It would appear that Reed was
right, historically at least, simply because Jefferson was never known
to have made such a distinction.
Four years later Zoraclh v. Clauson'"4 was decided. This time the
released time program, the one currently in effect in New York State,"'n
simply released children from public school classes, during the customary school hours, so that they might attend religious instruction given
elsewhere than in the public school building. 'Mr. Justice Douglas, for
himself and five other Justices, could not find here the captive audience
which McCollum counted or, at least, the moral persuasion or "compulsion" was not so readily present as it was when religious instruction
was given within the public school building during regular school hours.
Mr. Justice Douglas quoted some of the examples of cooperation between church and state which Mr. Justice Reed had noted in his
McCollum dissent. He noted that no child was forced to attend religious
103. 333 U.S. at 246.
104. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
105. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3210(b).
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classes, that the school authorities were neutral towards religion, that
the separation idea must not be pressed to its dry extreme, that the
establishment clause does not require religion and government to sit
apart in hostile camps, and that the state cannot prefer those who believe in no religion over those who do believe in some religion.
It would be easy to shift McCollum and Zorach on the basis of the
in-the-school, out-of-the-school distinction, on the ground that government property was used in McCollum but not in Zorach. Mr. Justice
Douglas noted this difference and stated his adherence to McCollum.
He also stated that he spoke, in this regard, for two of his colleagues. 1°0
A three-way split was discernible. The silence of the other three Justices
in the majority, Reed, Clark and Minton, would indicate that they
were as much opposed to McCollum as they were in agreement with
Zorach. The three dissenting Justices were with the majority in
McCollum and, therefore, were apparently of the opinion that compulsion in any form was to be discountenanced and that the use or
nonuse of state property as an aid per se was not controlling. It is
certain enough, after Zorach, that it is not the use of state property or
state funds which constitutes the aid but rather the use of state property and state funds in such a way as to constitute compulsion. And
it might possibly be that Mr. Justice Douglas, by his rather casual
reaffirmation of McCollum and his recognition of his need to reaffirm
was simply damning McCollum with faint praise.
This conclusion becomes compelling when we recall that the Court
has never denied the use of state or municipal property, state or municipal parks to those who would teach or preach religion so long as
the audience was free to turn away. 10 7 If it could not be said, simply
out of deference to young Vashti McCollum's insistence upon irreligion,
that the first aspect of McCollum, the idea that the use of state property
was per se an aid, was by Zorach consigned to "God's small acre,"
then, ironically enough, the Reverend Carl Jacob Kunz saw to it that
this part of McCollum got a decent burial."0 8
The Reverend Mr. Kunz was a Baptist preacher who testified that
he was commanded by God to "go out into the highways and byways"
and preach the word of God. So the Reverend Mr. Kunz regularly
mounted a loudspeaker on the roof of his Model T, parked it in the
city streets or in a convenient municipal park and blasted his religious
beliefs upon the unwilling ears of those who sought the quiet of the
106. 343 U.S. at 315 n.8.
107. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
108. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
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park for Sunday relaxation."10 The City of New York denied Reverend
Kunz a permit to proselytize upon its streets or in its parks. The
New York City licensing statute was found to be unconstitutional. The
Court apparently felt that it would be preferable for the city or the
state to regulate decibels rather than regulate religion.
Kunz suggested, therefore, that the state cannot prohibit sectarianism
on public property. McCollm suggested that the state cannot permit
sectarianism on public property. The secret of the paradox, so it seems
to me, is the presence or the absence of compulsion-compulsion as
that concept is conceived by the Supreme Court of the United States.
And we are back to the question: what is compulsion? How is it present
when the government provides aid to church-related schools? State law
may require a child to attend some school until he is old enough or
capable enough to shift for himself. But we do not present the teacher
of religion in the private school with a captive audience. The parent
of the child is free, free from any form of persuasion from the state,
free to choose in advance to send his child to a Catholic Parochial School
or a Jewish Day School or the Zionist School of the Missouri Synod
of the Lutheran Church. This is the freedom of choice constitutionally
guaranteed to the parent by Pierce v. Society of Sisters."' Would this
not appear to be quite the antithesis of compulsion?
Or does the compulsion come into being simply because there is
governmental aid? Does the compulsion come simply because governmental aid, howsoever small, somehow reaches the religious institution?
Certainly Cochran and Bradfield contradict that conclusion. If state aid
to church-related schools is inadmissible, it is inadmissible only because
it constitutes aid to religion as such rather than aid to education as
such and, though given without preference to any religion, might conceivably be an aid to all religion over irreligion. How that can be
when we would, in the logic of McCollhm, secularize the public school
and strip it of all religious vestiges, I cannot see. Nor can I see how
there can be a preference of all religion over irreligion when we aid
the secular aspects of sectarian education. Cochran again attests that
we can do that-unless we are ready to say that in the church-related
school religion permeates the whole of education and that we cannot
sever the secular from the sectarian. Surely this is an arbitary assertion.
For it is to assert that a child is taught the Catholic multiplication
tables, the Jewish geography or, if English be taught at all nowadays,
109. The Reverend Mr. Kunz did not so much preach his religion as he attac:cd that
of others. The Reverend Kunz called Catholicism "a religion of the devi," the Pepe "the

anti-Christ," and Jews "Christ-killers." Id. at 297.
110.

268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; see text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
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the Lutheran parts of speech. The fact is that these are secular subjects which, if characterization or coloration be objectionable, cannot
possibly be discolored. These are secular subjects whose content and
whose standards are fixed by the state, and if there be no compliance
with the state's standards, the sectarian school can, by state law, quite
forcefully be compelled to close its doors.
In brief, even if we must accept, though obviously we need not, all
the dicta in Everson, we do not, so long as we are guaranteed by
McCollum that we shall have an irreligious public school system, prefer
all religion over irreligion. Nor do we, so long as we can sever the
secular subject taught in the church-related school from the sectarian
subject taught there, provide tax money for religious indoctrination.
We are observant of Mr. Justice Black's caveat. We are, it seems
manifest to me, simply using tax money to assist secular instruction,
instruction which serves a public purpose. If we are to deny aid to
any private school because it, in addition to secular education, teaches
religion or because it provides what is commonly called a God-centered
education, then certainly we are preferring irreligion over all religion.
Then we are breaching the wall of separation because then we are
making the teaching of religion the concern of government so much
so that government is forbidden to lend aid only because the private
school undertakes to teach religion. And at that juncture we are at
the ultimately fine point not only of secularizing the public school but
of constitutionalizing irreligion.
How that ever could have been the intent of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison and their co-authors I cannot understand. How that can possibly
be the present posture of our law I cannot perceive, particularly when
we recall that the latest word we have heard from the Supreme Court
on this subject is that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Not only the latest word, but the earliest
word. And if they hear that, out of respect for a venerable tradition, we
must, when we provide federal funds in aid of education, turn away
the church-related school because and only because it is church-related,
Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison-in whatever part of paradise they
may be preparing new articles of confederation-must smile, but not
as sultans smile, as they settle back the quill. For if this be a tradition, it is, surely, a tradition which began in 1948.

